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This paper investigates the eects of labor market integration, in the form of worker
mobility, in a model with long-term labor contracts that lead to wage rigidities and un-
employment. Increased mobility leads to more exible labor market institutions in which
rms can more easily vary the level of employment in response to uctuations in demand.
Economic integration is potentially Pareto-improving but, in the absence of a system of com-
pensation, workers are harmed by greater labor mobility while the owners of rms benet
from higher prots.
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Worker Mobility, Earnings Risk, and Contract Structure
I. Introduction
Recent labor market experience in the US and Europe presents striking contrasts. While
the overall level of unemployment in Europe has been somewhat higher than that of the US,
the most remarkable dierence between the two is that the rate of unemployment diers
much more widely among EU countries than among regions within the US. Numerous ana-
lysts (e.g., Burda and Mertens (1995) or Bertola and Ichino (1995)) draw a sharp distinction
between exible \US-style" and rigid \European-style" labor market institutions, in which
the former are characterized by relatively little regulatory control, high interregional and
intersectoral mobility of labor, and wage exibility, while the latter exhibit strong regula-
tory constraints, collective bargaining arrangements that limit the ability of rms to adjust
employment and wages in the face of changing market conditions, and relatively limited in-
tersectoral and interregional mobility of labor. These institutional dierences, it is argued,
explain why some European countries have suered from persistently higher unemployment
than others. In the US, rapidly-growing industries and regions can, with relative ease, at-
tract workers from industries and regions that are experiencing job losses; by contrast, it
appears that European labor market institutions prevent wage rates from adjusting down-
ward in industries and regions experiencing weak demand for labor, causing employment
levels to fall, while limited mobility of workers among sectors and regions prevents those
who lose (or fail to obtain) jobs in their home countries from nding employment where
economic conditions are more favorable.
A number of well-known models of labor markets, such as the \insider-outsider" model,
models of unionized labor markets, implicit contract models, and job-matching models,
have been proposed to explain the existence of labor market rigidities that can give rise
to unemployment and to analyze the implications of alternative economic policies within
specic institutional settings. In particular, with respect to Europe, the analytical and
policy debate has focused on the issue of how economic policy can change labor market
\institutions" in ways that might alleviate unemployment. Generally speaking, however,
the literature has regarded as exogenously given what one might refer to as the fundamental
or \intrinsic" determinants of labor market rigidity. One of these is the cost of adjustment
in the labor market, and specically the cost that workers incur in switching jobs. For
example, the US market seems to exhibit considerable wage exibility. This exibility,
i.e. the comparative ease with which wages can be adjusted, might be expected to give
rise to large wage dierentials among sectors and regions. Indeed, real wages certainly are
not identical for all US workers with given skill and other attributes. But { focusing for
concreteness on job switching that involves movement among spatially-distinct labor markets
1{ there is a high degree of mobility among regions in the US, as evidenced by persistently
high rates of internal migration, so that wage dierentials are eroded by migration from low-
to high-wage areas. Suppose instead that internal migration in the US were more costly, as
is true in Europe. In this case, if we continue to regard as exogenous those labor market
institutions that determine the degree of wage exibility, we would expect to observe large
variations in wages among regions. However, one might then also expect that workers facing
highly variable wages would seek to protect themselves from a much higher level of wage risk
than that faced by US workers, and that labor market institutions themselves would then
take a rather dierent form, for instance by developing various \European-style" rigidities.
In turn, this would give rise to greater interregional variations in unemployment rates,
as rms experiencing adverse market conditions would respond by reducing employment
while workers without jobs in one region would be less able to nd alternative employment
elsewhere.
These considerations suggest that the labor market institutions that are believed to
account for the varying experiences in US and European labor markets 1 should be viewed,
at least in part, as endogenously dependent upon underlying determinants of worker mobility,
and not only upon economic policies such as labor and social regulation. Or, indeed, we
might say that economic policies such as labor and social regulations, in addition to private-
sector contracting and bargaining practices in labor markets, are themselves part of the
institutional structure to be explained. 2
The present analysis provides a possible explanation for the observed correlation be-
tween worker mobility and labor market institutions that give rise to or help to sustain wage
rigidities. In doing so, we build upon and extend the implicit contract model originated by
Baily (1974), Gordon (1974), and Azariadis (1975) where wage rigidities and layos emerge
as an equilibrium feature of labor contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral
employers. We interpret the implicit contract model more broadly than is usual however,
thinking of the implicit contract not only as a contract between a particular rm and its
workers but rather as a body of labor market institutions encompassing and supporting
the contracts struck between individual rms and workers. Unlike previous analyses, we
explicitly allow for workers who are laid o because of adverse local shocks to move, at a
cost, to other regions in which labor market conditions are more favorable. Thus, we use
the implicit-contract model to explain not just \layos" but \turnover", or, expressed in
slightly dierent terms, to explain not only the reallocation of workers from employment to
leisure (or unemployment) but the reallocation of workers from one employer to another. 3
1 See Nickell (1997) and Nickell and Layard (1999) for recent surveys of labor market
institutions and their impact on unemployment.
2 In this respect our approach is rather similar to that of Agell (1999, 2000).
3 Gottfries (1992) emphasizes that traditional implicit-contract models focus exclusively
2By allowing for the possibility that workers from outside of a region may enter and nd em-
ployment there, the analysis integrates elements from \inside-outsider" models (Lindbeck
and Snower (1988)) into an implicit-contract framework. 4 In comparison to previous litera-
ture on migration, our model insists neither on perfect wage exibility that guarantees that
labor markets always clear nor (as in the Harris-Todaro (1970) tradition) on exogenously-
given wage rigidities that insure that labor markets always exhibit unemployment. Rather,
it is the fundamental determinants of worker mobility, as represented in the model by some
intrinsic cost of migration, that determine the structure of labor contracts and, in turn, the
extent of wage rigidity and unemployment that is observed in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II begins by presenting the basic implicit-
contract model that underlies the analysis. In Section II.A we develop a standard implicit
contract model, which we refer to as the \autarky" case, where migration costs are pro-
hibitively high so that workers cannot move among regions. Section II.B begins the analysis
of worker mobility by considering how implicit contracts are determined within a single
region within a system of regions. Here, it is assumed that migration costs are no longer
prohibitively high so that, in the event of favorable demand shocks, it is possible for workers
from other regions to immigrate or, in the event of adverse demand shocks, workers can
emigrate and obtain jobs in regions with high labor demand.
Our primary interest, however, is not in the structure of equilibrium labor contracts in
a single jurisdiction, but rather in the way that mobility inuences labor market conditions
in an entire system of jurisdictions. In this, we dier from Ethier (1985), who (to our knowl-
edge) is the only other author to study migration in an economy where at least some workers
are subject to implicit contracts. Whereas Ethier assumes that a single jurisdiction faces an
innitely-elastic supply of migrants at an exogenously-xed wage rate, we instead suppose
that the immigrants in one labor market are emigrants from another, and investigate how
the equilibrium contract structures, levels of unemployment, migration, and wage rates for
migrants in all markets are determined simultaneously. 5 The major analytical contribution
of the paper, the task of Section III, is to extend the implicit-contract model to investigate
on layos, whereas a great deal of labor-market adjust occurs through hiring; it is therefore
important to accommodate both. A number of other studies have discussed the importance
of turnover for wage setting and employment; see, e.g., Saint-Paul (1997) and the recent
survey by Bertola (1999). (It should be noted, however, that our analysis is not designed to
address issues of explicit labor market dynamics, such as duration of unemployment spells.)
4 Leslie (1992) in particular argues that implicit-contract and insider-outsider models
should be viewed in many respects as complements rather than as substitutes.
5 Another critical dierence between our analysis and that of Ethier is that we assume
that no jurisdiction is suciently large to inuence world prices for traded goods, whereas
Ethier focuses on a single jurisdiction that is a dominant exporter of a single traded good.
3wages, employment, layos, and migration within an imperfectly-integrated set of regional
labor markets necessitates the development of a complete general-equilibrium analysis of the
simultaneous determination of contract structures in many regions. We show that there are
two possible types of equilibria, one, a \mixed" regime (Section III.A) in which both migra-
tion and unemployment are observed, and the other, a \full-employment" regime (Section
III.B) in which all workers that are laid o in regions experiencing adverse shocks migrate to
other regions and unemployment completely disappears. General-equilibrium comparative-
statics analysis shows how labor market conditions such as wage rate and employment levels
depend on the degree of labor mobility. As polar extreme cases, labor markets are char-
acterized (Section III.C) by high migration and full labor-market clearing when migration
costs are suciently low (or zero) and by wage rigidities and unemployment when migration
costs are suciently high (or prohibitive).
Equipped with these comparative-statics results, Section IV explores the welfare im-
plications of increased economic integration. In particular, we study the eects of reduced
migration costs on the distribution of income between workers and the recipients of prot in-
come from rms and on overall economic welfare within the system of jurisdictions. Section
V summarizes the main results and discusses some policy implications of the analysis.
II. The Model
Our objective is to present a general equilibrium analysis of the eects of labor market
integration in a system of regions, within each of which workers and rms negotiate long-
term wage and employment contracts under conditions of uncertainty. The extent of \labor
market integration" in the present framework will be parameterized by a variable c which
represents the cost incurred by a worker in moving from one region to another. Throughout
the paper, we will think of geographic regions as a basic unit of analysis. Insofar as we
interpret implicit contracts to refer not only to purely private arrangements between workers
and rms but also to public-sector policies such as labor-market regulations, a \region"
should be considered to be a \jurisdiction", that is, as a region within which a particular
public regulatory and policy structure is implemented. However, it should be also noted that
what we call \regions" could, for many purposes, equally be viewed as \sectors". Indeed,
insofar as regions specialize in particular industries { and such specialization presumably is
an important reason why shocks are not perfectly correlated among regions { geographic
and intersectoral mobility coincide. For example, expansion of nancial services or high-
tech employment and contraction of agriculture or heavy manufacturing (intersectoral labor
ows) have historically been accompanied by inter-regional labor ows (e.g., rural/urban or
Rust Belt/Sun Belt migration). It has been widely observed (see, e.g., Shin (1997)) that
intersectoral shocks and associated reallocations of labor typically involve larger adjustment
costs and play a larger role in explaining aggregate unemployment than intrasectoral shocks.
When regions specialize in particular sectors, the inter-sectoral reallocation of labor will
entail not only the costs associated with switching employers but the costs of switching
regions. Thus, the variable c which measures labor market integration can be taken to
4reect not only the costs of relocation across space but also the costs of movements of labor
among sectors.
It is convenient to begin by describing how contracts are determined by the workers
and rms in a single jurisdiction in isolation, as would be the case if migration costs are
prohibitively high. Once this autarky case is analyzed, we can then extend the analysis to
incorporate the interactions between labor markets of dierent jurisdictions as migration
costs fall.
A. Implicit Contract Equilibria in Autarky
Consider rst the case where migration cost c is so high that no migration occurs in
equilibrium, that is, migration costs are prohibitive. This assumption, which corresponds
to the closed-economy models used in all previous literature on implicit contracts of which
we are aware, means that the potential labor force in a given jurisdiction consists only
of those individuals who reside there initially. 6 Let  n, assumed for simplicity to be the
same for all regions, denote the number of initial residents. As is standard in models of
implicit contracts, production is assumed to be subject to stochastic shocks. Firms (or,
more precisely, their owners) are assumed to be risk-neutral while workers are risk-averse.
Each rm competes for workers by oering implicit long-term contracts which specify the
rm's state-contingent wage and layo policies. These implicit contracts oer workers some
degree of job security and insurance against wage risk. We do not attempt to model exactly
how implicit contracts are enforced, but note that rms and workers have incentives to
commit themselves to fulll such contracts if they can. Firms can commit themselves by
e.g. oering high severance payments in case of lay-os or by having built up reputation
which they can lose in repeated games. Workers' remuneration may be in part conditional
on the contract duration (cf. Feldstein (1976), Baily (1977)). As we have observed above,
labor market institutions, including public- or quasi-public regulatory and organizational
structures (labor laws, collective bargaining frameworks, unions, etc.) can be viewed as part
of an enforcement mechanism over and above whatever purely private mechanisms are open
to individual workers and rms.
To analyze the equilibrium labor contract in detail, assume for simplicity that the rms
in a given region produce output under conditions of multiplicative uncertainty and that
there are two possible states of the world, a \good" state which occurs with probability 
and a \bad" state which occurs with the complementary probability. Output (or the value
of output) is given by pif(ni) where f is a strictly increasing and concave function 7 of the
6 See, e.g., Rosen (1985), Taylor (1987) for expositions of the standard implicit-contract
model.
7 As is standard in models of interregional factor mobility, the concavity of the production
function reects the presence of immobile and xed factors of production such as land or
natural resources. In addition, depending on the time horizon of the analysis, capital could
also be included among these xed factors. (In a \long-run" interpretation of the model,
5number of workers employed in state i (f0 > 0 > f00) and where pi is a random variable
which may take on either of two values, pi, i = 1;2. Assume that p1 > p2, so that state 1 can
be identied as the \good" state and state 2 as the \bad" state. 8 It is assumed that there
are many rms in each region and the random variable pi is common to all rms within a
region; under these assumptions, one may interpret pif(ni) as the (value of) output of all
of the rms within a region, as a function of the total number of workers employed by all
rms.
Partial Equilibrium Determination of Implicit Contracts. Firms compete ex ante to
attract workers, oering contracts which specify the wage wi to be paid in each state of
nature and the number of workers ni employed in each state. In particular, rms may
choose to employ more workers in the good state than in the bad state, and the dierence
between n1 and n2 represents \unemployment" due to layos. 9 It is assumed that all workers
have an equal likelihood of layos in the bad state, i.e., given the contract (w1;w2;n1;n2),
each worker faces an ex ante probability (n1  n2)=n1 of being laid o in the bad state. The
expected prot of a rm that oers a contract (w1;w2;n1;n2) is given by
A = (p1f(n1)   w1n1) + (1   )(p2f(n2)   w2n2): (1)
Worker preferences are represented by a strictly increasing and concave utility-of-income
function u() dened over wage income. If workers are laid o, they may engage in \home
production" or leisure, and may also receive cash or in-kind benets from the government,
capital would be viewed as a variable factor. As long as rms are able to obtain capital at an
exogenously-xed supply price { if, for instance, capital is obtained at a rate of return that
is xed on world markets { the explicit incorporation of variable capital as an additional
factor of production would change none of our analysis or results.) The strict concavity of
the production function means that rms earn \prots" after covering the costs of hiring
labor; these \prots" should be interpreted as rents (or quasi-rents) accruing to the xed
(or quasi-xed) factors. In particular, nothing in our model precludes free entry by rms;
when entry is free and capital is variable, it is only necessary to attribute the concavity of
the production technology to immobile resources like land, and to interpret \prots" as the
rents earned by the owners of these resources.
8 One possible interpretation of the random variable pi is that it could represent the
price of a rm's output on world markets; alternatively, the risk facing the rm may be
technological in nature.
9 Since any state-contingent reductions in employment are contracted in advance, it can
be argued that \unemployment" in this framework is not involuntary in an ex ante sense.
One can view layos as simply \turnover" or \separations." Within the context of the present
analysis, these terms can be viewed as equivalent. Notice that in the present framework the
number of separations in the bad state may be smaller than it would be in a Walrasian labor
market. This \over-employment" result depends on the symmetric information assumption
applied here. Hart (1981) and Grossman and Hart (1981, 1983) have shown, however, that
with asymmetric information there will be more unemployment with implicit contracts than
in a Walrasian labor market because laying o workers is the only way for rms to signal
workers that the rm is in a bad state of the world.
6receiving a level of utility u(b) where b denotes cash benets plus the cash equivalent of any
in-kind benets provided by the public sector, together with the monetized value of all non-
market uses of time. Individual rms can hire as many workers as desired ex ante, provided
that their contracts oer a level of expected utility that is at least as great as the expected
utility that workers can obtain elsewhere, denoted by ~ uA. (The general-equilibrium deter-
mination of ~ uA is discussed further below.) Thus, the problem facing a rm in formulating
an implicit contract can be written
(PA) max<w1;w2;n1;n2> A
subject to
u(w1) + (1   )
n2
n1
u(w2) + (1   )
n1   n2
n1
u(b)   ~ uA  0 (2)
Letting LA(n1;n2;w1;w2;A) represent the Lagrangian for (PA) where A is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the expected-utility constraint (2), the rst-order conditions char-
acterizing the prot-maximizing choice of wages in each period are
@LA
@w1
=  n1 + Au0(w1) = 0 (3a)
@LA
@w2
=  (1   )n2 + A(1   )
n2
n1
u0(w2) = 0: (3b)
Using these equations to eliminate A, 10 it follows that
u0(w1) = u0(w2) , w1 = w2;
that is, the wage rate is state-invariant under an equilibrium implicit contract. Henceforth,
this state-invariant wage is denoted by w.
The rst-order conditions for the choice of employment levels in each state are
@LA
@n1

























Using (3a) to eliminate A in (3c), we obtain






As the right-hand side is positive, the left-hand side can be interpreted as an insurance
premium that workers pay to the rm in the good state in order to obtain insurance against
income risk (see, e.g., Taylor (1987), p. 13). Furthermore, eliminating A from (3d) yields




10 It is easily veried that that the expected utility constraint (2) is always binding at a
solution to (PA) so that A > 0.
7Thus, the marginal product of labor in the bad state is less than the wage rate. As is
well-known, there are reasonable conditions under which n1 > n2, implying that rms lay
o workers in the bad state. 11 For our purposes, the reason for considering a model with
implicit contracts is that it provides a framework within which layos and unemployment can
occur, and therefore we assume that these conditions are satised in the following analysis.
General Equilibrium in Autarky. The analysis thus far has examined the implicit con-
tract that rms oer to workers given that they engage in ex ante competition for labor and
must oer contracts that provide at least a specied level of expected utility, ~ uA. Individual
competitive rms act as though they can hire as many workers as they wish, subject to this
constraint. However, ex ante equilibrium in the labor market of an autarkic jurisdiction
requires that there be no excess demand for labor, i.e., n1   n. Intuitively, if ~ uA, the level
of utility that rms must oer workers, is suciently low, wages and layo policies will be
suciently protable to rms that they would wish to hire more workers than are available
in the labor force, i.e., n1 >  n, and in this case rms will nd it advantageous to oer
somewhat more attractive contracts to workers. As this competition for workers proceeds,
the level of utility that workers can obtain in the labor market rises, and as ~ uA goes up, the
number of workers that rms wish to hire will fall. As shown in Appendix A, comparative
statics analysis conrms that @n1=@~ uA < 0. Conversely, if ~ uA is \too high," there will be
excess supply in the labor market. Firms will be able to hire as many workers as desired
while oering somewhat less attractive contracts, causing ~ uA to fall and n1 to rise. The
reservation utility level obtained by unemployed workers, u(b), puts a lower bound on the
value of ~ uA, however, and it is possible that n1 <  n when ~ uA = u(b), in which case there
is ex ante excess supply of labor in equilibrium. Throughout the analysis, we assume that
this is not the case, so that ~ uA > u(b) and n1 =  n in equilibrium. 12
B. Implicit Contract Equilibria for a Single Open Jurisdiction
Now consider the case where migration costs c are suciently low that workers may
move from one region to another. For the sake of analytical simplicity, suppose that there
are many jurisdictions which initially contain identical numbers of workers  n and whose
rms have identical technologies, as represented by the production function f. Output
in each jurisdiction is characterized by multiplicative uncertainty of the form described
above, and the random variable pi is independently and identically distributed across all
regions. With many jurisdictions, by the law of large numbers, the proportion of jurisdictions
experiencing favorable technological realizations (pi = p1) is equal to  while the proportion
11 Specically, n1 > n2 if w  p2f0(n1) > u(w) u(b)=u0(w): See Taylor (1987, p. 16), for
further discussion.
12 More generally, ex ante equilibrium in the labor market is characterized by the com-
plementary-slackness type condition (~ uA   u(b))( n   n1) = 0:
8(1   ) experience an unfavorable realization p2. Migration occurs when rms in regions
experiencing favorable technology shocks are able to attract workers who have been laid
o from jobs in regions experiencing unfavorable shocks. Migrant workers are assumed
to participate in a spot labor market in regions where rms are hiring additional labor,
rather than entering into new long-term implicit contracts, reecting their more transient
and less-established relationships with employers. 13 This spot market is assumed to operate
under conditions of perfect competition, so that new (migrant) workers are paid according
to their marginal products; assuming that migration costs are independent of the origin or
destination of migrants, arbitrage in the market for migrant workers means that all will earn
the same wage in equilibrium, denoted by w.
In the case of autarky, the marginal product of labor in favorable states of nature is
equal to p1f0( n). This places an upper bound w
max on the spot wage; if migration actually
occurs, the amount of employment in jurisdictions experiencing favorable shocks will exceed
 n and w will thus be less than w
max. It is clear, therefore, that no migration can occur if
c > p1f0( n) b since workers can always receive b as a minimum when laid o, and the spot
wage must thus be at least equal to b + c before any migration occurs.
While c  p1f0( n) b = w
max b  c is a necessary condition for any migration to take
place, the precise amount of migration that occurs depends on the nature of the implicit
contracts that are established between workers and rms and, in particular, on the number
of workers laid o by rms experiencing unfavorable shocks. In turn, however, the conditions
of the implicit contract may depend on the feasibility and cost of migration; in particular,
workers may willingly accept contracts with higher levels of layos if migration provides
good job opportunities when layos occur. We must therefore analyze how the equilibrium
implicit contract, i.e., the degree of labor market rigidity, depends on the mobility of workers.
The present subsection considers only how the equilibrium implicit contract is deter-
mined in a single jurisdiction, assuming that migration costs are not prohibitively high
(c  c). Since the spot wage w is determined in competitive markets involving rms and
workers from many regions, it is taken as parametrically given by the rms and workers
in any one jurisdiction. The description of how the value of w* is determined as part of
the general equilibrium for an entire system of regions is postponed to Section III. As in
the autarky case, rms within a single region compete in a local ex ante labor market by
oering implicit contracts subject to an expected utility constraint. The formal analysis of
the rm's problem with migration is very similar to that of the autarky case, except that it
13 One could imagine that workers who migrate to a new region gradually establish them-
selves on an equal footing with existing native workers and thus participate in the same types
of long-term implicit contracts as existing workers. Such contracts would provide workers,
including immigrants, with some protection against future risks; however, the present anal-
ysis focuses on migration as an ex post response to the realization of economic risks and
as such it is appropriate to distinguish between the labor market conditions facing workers
who do not migrate and those who do.
9is necessary to take into account the fact that rms may hire migrant workers in the ex post
spot market if they have favorable technological shocks and that workers who are laid o in
the bad state may nd migration to be a better alternative than remaining unemployed in
their original jurisdiction of residence.
A rm's wage and employment policy in the presence of migration can be represented
by a vector (w1;w2;n0;n1;n2) describing the wages that it pays in each state to workers
engaged in an implicit contract with it, w1 and w2, the number of workers in the ex ante labor
market that accept the rm's oer of an implicit contract, n0, and the level of employment
in each state, n1 and n2. Due to the possibility of migration, a rm may choose n1 >  n in
the ex post spot market for migrant labor. The dierence between the number of workers
hired initially and those employed in the bad state, n0   n2, represents layos. Of course,
n0   n, and, as will be shown later, n0 =  n in equilibrium in most cases of interest.
A rm's expected prots when migration is possible can now be written as
M = (p1f(n1)   w1n0   w(n1   n0)) + (1   )(p2f(n2)   w2n2); (5)
note that any workers hired in the ex post spot market for labor are paid w. Firms can
implement a wage and employment policy (w1;w2;n0;n1;n2) only if the expected utility
of the workers initially residing in the jurisdiction is at least as great as ~ uM, the utility
that they can attain if they refuse to accept a rm's implicit contract in the ex ante labor
market. 14 The maximization problem facing a rm can thus be formulated as
(PM) max<w1;w2;n0;n1;n2> M
subject to
u(w1) + (1   )
n2
n0
u(w2) + (1   )
n0   n2
n0
u(w   c)   ~ uM  0; (6)
assuming that migration is at least as attractive to laid-o workers as unemployment, i.e.,
u(w  c)  u(b). 15 Letting LM(n1;n2;w1;w2;M) represent the Lagrangian for (PM), the
rst-order conditions characterizing the prot-maximizing choice of wages in each period are
@LM
@w1
=  n0 + Mu0(w1) = 0 (7a)
@LM
@w2
=  (1   )n2 + M(1   )
n2
n0
u0(w2) = 0: (7b)
14 The determination of the equilibrium value of ~ uM is discussed at the end of this section.
15 The objective of the analysis at this stage is to describe how the terms of implicit
contracts are determined, assuming that migration actually occurs. This can only be the
case if u(w   c)  u(b).
10Using these equations to eliminate M, it follows that
u0(w1) = u0(w2) , w1 = w2; (8)
that is, exactly as in the autarky case, the wage rate is state-invariant under an equilibrium
implicit contract. Henceforth, this state-invariant wage is denoted by w.
The rst-order conditions for the choice of ex ante and ex post employment levels are
@LM
@n0
= (w   w) + (1   )
n2
n0





= (p1f0(n1)   w) = 0 (7d)
@LM
@n2
= (1   )(p2f0(n2)   w) + (1   )
u(w)   u(w   c)
u0(w)
= 0; (7e)
where (7a) is used to eliminate M.
Rearranging (7c),





u(w)   u(w   c)
u0(w)
: (9)
As in the autarky case, the left-hand side can be interpreted as an insurance premium that
workers pay to the rm in the good state to obtain insurance against income risk. It follows
immediately from (9) that
w = w if c = 0 (10a)
w > w > w   c if c > 0 (10b)
Hence, in the special case of zero migration costs, there exists only one wage rate w = w,
so that workers always obtain employment at the same wage no matter whether there is a
favorable or unfavorable shock in the jurisdiction where they reside. This polar case illus-
trates the important point that migration can insure workers from unemployment risk and
the associated risk of reduced income and welfare. In this case, there is no need for the
insurance that implicit contracts can provide and, therefore, no reason for labor markets
to exhibit rigidities that might give rise to unemployment. When migration costs are pos-
itive, however, workers will be better o under favorable technology shocks in their home
jurisdiction, and long-term contracts will continue to serve as a partial insurance device. In
the good state, as (7d) and (10b) reveal, non-migrant (\native") workers pay an \insurance
premium" to their employer in the form of the dierence between their wage w and the spot
wage earned by immigrant workers, which is equal to the value of the marginal product of
labor in the good state, i.e., they pay a premium of
p1f0(n1)   w = w   w > 0: (11)
11In the bad state, however, they receive a wage higher than the value of the marginal product;
from (7e), it follows that
w   p2f0(n2) =
u(w)   u(w   c)
u0(w)
> 0: (12)
Note that the workers who are laid o in the bad state can get a higher wage abroad
than they could get at home if employed. At rst glance, this may seem paradoxical, since
one normally associates a loss of employment with a loss of income. To avoid confusion, it
must thus be emphasized that w is the \producer price" of migrant labor in the ex post
spot market, whereas w   c is what migrants actually receive on net. The migration cost
\wedge" between the price paid by rms for workers and the net income received by workers
can be divided in many ways, and the observed wage paid by rms to new workers may
lie anywhere in the interval [w   c;w] depending on how the costs of migration are split
between workers and their employers. For example, rms that have experienced favorable
technology shocks and that are hiring workers in the spot market might in practice absorb
some or all of the out-of-pocket costs of relocation for workers, the costs of advertising and
recruiting for new employees, and the costs of training workers for their new jobs, all of
which should be interpreted as part of migration costs, c. Having covered these costs, the
explicit wage paid to employees would be correspondingly reduced. 16 There may remain
some costs of migration { search costs, some out-of-pocket relocation costs, subjective losses
from disruption of one's aairs associated with relocation { that workers end up absorbing.
The wage net of all migration costs w c will be equal to the wage actually paid to workers
less that portion of migration costs absorbed by workers, and, by (10b), we know that
w  c < w, that is, workers who are laid o are denitely worse o than those who are not
laid o. In fact, the observed wage that rms pay to newly-hired workers will lie below the
wage w received by existing workers if rms absorb a relatively high proportion of the costs
of migration. 17
16 Note that domestic workers cannot apply for a spot market job as the implict contract
is (assumed to be) enforceable, as discussed above.
17 It goes beyond the scope of our formal analysis to consider heterogeneity of workers.
However, in practice, seniority rules will typically mean that laid-o workers are younger and
less experienced than those retained by employers experiencing unfavorable shocks. If one
thinks of younger workers as possessing less eective labor services than those who are more
experienced, then young migrant workers who are laid o by rms facing unfavorable shocks
and who are then hired by rms in other regions experiencing favorable shocks will tend
to receive lower observed wages per worker than the more senior workers already employed
by these rms. For this reason, as well as those mentioned above, it would be incorrect
to interpret (10b) to imply that the observed wage paid to newly-hired migrant workers
would exceed the wage paid to a rm's existing work force. It may further be noted that
empirical evidence (e.g., Topel (1991)) indicates that job changes account for a substantial
amount of lifetime earnings growth for typical workers. Ignoring the costs of job search and
relocation, therefore, it is evidently true empirically that workers often obtain higher wages
after separations.
12The fact that workers who migrate (or remain unemployed) are worse o than those
who are not laid o is the key to understanding how the equilibrium level of expected utility,
~ uM, is determined. Just as in the autarky case, clearing of the ex ante labor market requires
that ~ uM adjust so that all of the workers who initially reside in a region do in fact enter into
an employment relationship with a local rm. Failure to obtain a job initially means that
workers will either be hired by local rms at a wage of w if there is a favorable realization
of technology or, if there is an unfavorable realization, they will either migrate to another
region and receive w   c or remain unemployed and receive b. We assume, however, that
implicit contracts dominate this alternative, so that n0 =  n at the equilibrium value of
~ uM. 18
III. General Equilibrium in a System of Jurisdictions with Migration and
Implicit Contracts
The analysis so far has examined how implicit contracts would be determined within
a given region when it is possible for laid-o workers to migrate to other region and earn
an exogenously-given spot wage of w. However, although w is taken as given by any one
region, its equilibrium value is determined by the competition for migrant workers in the
system of regions as a whole. Since the supply of workers to the spot market depends on
the willingness of laid-o workers to migrate in search of other jobs, which in turn depends
on the level of migration costs c, we expect that the equilibrium spot wage ultimately
depends on the value of c as well. The objective of this section is to analyze how the entire
general equilibrium structure of spot wages and implicit contracts for the whole system of
jurisdictions depends on the migration cost parameter c.
As the analysis will make clear, there are two distinct types of equilibria that can
arise. Speaking informally, when migration costs are suciently high, relatively few laid-o
workers will, in equilibrium, choose to migrate to other jurisdictions, since the benets of
higher wages elsewhere are largely oset by the cost of moving. In these cases, some but
not all of the workers laid o by rms in regions experiencing unfavorable technology shocks
will leave to nd jobs elsewhere; those left behind will remain unemployed and receive the
reservation income b. On the other hand, if migration costs are suciently low, the payo to
workers from migration will be highly attractive relative to unemployment and workers will
then choose not to remain unemployed. We call the latter situation a \full-employment"
regime, while the former case, in which there is some migration but also some unemployment,
is called a \mixed" regime. Intuitively, the mixed regime is an intermediate case between
autarky (i.e., prohibitively high migration costs) and free mobility. It is of course the mixed
case that is of greatest interest in the present context, since it is the mainly the existence of
unemployment that motivates consideration of implicit contract models to begin with. We
18 In general, if migration costs are lower than c, ex ante labor market equilibrium requires
that (~ uM   [u(w) + (1   )u(w   c)])( n   n0) = 0, analogously to footnote 7.
13now analyze the general equilibrium of the system of jurisdiction for each of these cases.
A. General Equilibrium in the Mixed Regime
Imagine to start with that the migration cost parameter c is just equal to c  w
max b.
At this value of c, w
max is in fact the equilibrium spot wage. At this wage, rms are
unwilling to hire any additional workers when technology shocks are favorable, and workers
are indierent between remaining unemployed (and receiving an income of b) and migrating
(and receiving an income net of migration costs of w
max   c), so that there is no excess
demand for or supply of labor in the spot market. If the migration cost parameter c falls
below c, workers who are laid o would denitely prefer to nd employment in the spot
market at a wage of w
max rather than remain unemployed, since their income would then
be strictly higher (w
max   c > b), and thus for c < c there would be excess supply in the
spot labor market if w = w
max. There would thus be downward pressure on the spot wage
as c falls and the amount of labor demanded by rms in the spot market would rise, so that
there would be a strictly positive level of migration.
For any given spot wage w, the average demand for labor in the spot market is given
by (n1(w)    n) where n1(w) is determined by the condition
p1f0(n1) = w: (13)
Obviously, @n1(w)=@w = 1=p1f00
1 (n1) < 0. The mean supply of workers to the spot market
is perfectly elastic, up to the quantity (1   )( n   n2), provided that w   c = b; for lower
values of w, the supply of labor is zero (workers prefer unemployment to migration), and
for higher values of w, the supply of labor is equal to (1 )( n n2) (migration dominates
unemployment for all laid-o workers). The equilibrium value of w is thus
w = b + c (14)
for any value of c and n2 such that
(n1(w)    n) < (1   )( n   n2): (15)
These two conditions dene a general equilibrium in the mixed regime. Condition (14)
states that workers who are laid o will be indierent between migrating to nd new jobs
and receiving their reservation income of b in their home jurisdiction. Condition (15) states
that the number of workers absorbed as new hires in the spot market (the left-hand side) is
less than the number laid o by rms experiencing unfavorable shocks (the right-hand side).
The inequality in (15) means that there is some unemployment in equilibrium, and it is this
condition which is no longer satised in the full-employment regime discussed in the next
subsection. Note that (15) denitely holds when c = c, since then the left-hand side is zero
while the right-hand side is positive. As discussed further in Appendix B, the functions in
(15) are continuous in c, which means that the system must be in a mixed equilibrium for
some range of values of c that are suciently close to c.
14Changes in the extent of labor market integration in this system can be represented
by changes in the migration cost parameter c. In general, greater economic integration will
aect the entire equilibrium structure of wages and employment throughout the system of
jurisdictions. General-equilibrium comparative statics analysis of the eect of changes in c
shows that:
Theorem 1: For values of the migration cost parameter c such that the system reaches a
mixed equilibrium, increased economic integration (i.e., a reduction in the migration cost
parameter c) results in:
(i) a decrease in the ex post spot-market wage rate w (i.e., dw=dc > 0);
(ii) a decrease in the wage rate obtained under the terms of the implicit contract w (i.e.,
dw=dc > 0));
(iii) an increase in the level of employment in the good state (i.e., dn1=dc < 0);
(iv) a decrease in the level of employment in the bad state (i.e., dn2=dc > 0).
Proof: See Appendix B.
While the full proof of this theorem is given in an appendix, it is immediately apparent
from (14) that @w=@c = 1, from which (i) clearly follows. Intuitively, a reduction in
migration costs increases the supply of workers in the spot market, resulting in a decrease
in the spot wage and an increase in employment in the good state (iii). In turn, this means
that the implicit insurance premium charged by rms for protection of workers { which is the
dierence between the marginal product of labor in the good state and the implicit contract
wage w, as shown in (9) { would fall, cet. par.. The rm therefore requires compensation
either in the form of a lower implicit contract wage w or, alternatively, by insisting on more
layos in the bad state. In fact, dierentiating (12) shows that a change in the implicit
contract wage or level of layos alone cannot be optimal, and thus, as stated in (ii) and (iv),
both of these adjustments { i.e., a reduction in w and an increase in layos in the bad state
{ occur in equilibrium. 19
Increased economic integration, then, has several important impacts on the structure
of employment, output, and compensation in the economy. It gives rise to greater local
uctuations in both output and employment, as layos are increased in the bad state and
there is increased hiring in the spot market when there are favorable production shocks.
Implicit contracts can shelter workers from income risk resulting from production shocks,
19 Total dierentiation of (12) with respect to n2 and c reduces the left-hand side while
leaving the right-hand side unchanged (recalling that w c is constant in the mixed regime).
Similarly, an increase in w alone must also lower the left-hand side relative to the right-hand
side, given that workers are risk averse.
15but the level of the protection provided to workers through these contracts is diminished,
in equilibrium, when the interjurisdictional mobility of workers is increased. Increased in-
tegration of labor markets thus leads rms to provide less insurance to workers than would
otherwise be the case. The rise in layos in the bad state indicates a less rigid labor market,
showing that the extent of labor market integration inuences the degree of exibility in
observed labor market institutions.
B. General Equilibrium in the Full-Employment Regime
As noted, the mixed regime must occur when migration costs are suciently high.
However, when migration costs are suciently low, there may be no unemployment at all.
As shown in (10a), w = w = w   c when c = 0, which means that workers who are
laid o are no worse o than those who are not laid o or who are initially employed in
regions that have favorable production shocks. In this case, workers who initially reside
in regions experiencing unfavorable shocks and who are laid o can costlessly relocate to
regions experiencing favorable shocks, earning the spot wage w. The implicit contract
completely degenerates in this case, with rms always employing workers at a level where
their state-contingent marginal product is equal to their wage; workers face no wage risk,
pay no implicit insurance premium, and receive no implicit insurance benets. Provided
that the equilibrium wage with zero migration costs strictly exceeds the reservation income
b, no workers who are laid o will remain unemployed. Adverse production shocks produce
labor turnover in this case, but do not produce unemployment. Workers are therefore
completely insured against unemployment and income risk by a fully integrated and exible
labor market. This conrms, for the extreme case where c = 0, the nding obtained in
a full-employment market-clearing model in Wildasin (1995) that free mobility itself can
provide perfect insurance against income risk.
We assume henceforth that the economy does achieve full employment when c = 0,
which will be the case if b is suciently small or the equilibrium wage with zero migration
costs is suciently high. 20 As discussed further in Appendix C, the equilibrium of the
system varies continuously in the migration cost parameter c, and it thus follows that the
economy will be in the full-employment regime for all values of c suciently close to 0.
20 The equilibrium wage with zero migration costs satises
p1f0(n1) = p2f0(n2):
Full employment requires that
n1 + (1   )n2 =  n:
These two conditions determine n1 and n2 and thus the equilibrium wage p1f0(n1) =
p2f0(n2); it is easily veried that the equilibrium wage is lower, the higher the value of
 n. Thus, provided that either b is suciently small,  n is suciently small, or both, the
equilibrium wage with zero migration costs must exceed b.
16As in the mixed regime, a change in migration costs aects the general equilibrium con-
stellation of wages and employment levels of the economy. In the mixed regime, condition
(14) provides a rigid linkage between the equilibrium spot-market wage w and the migration
cost parameter c. In the full-employment case, by contrast, changes in c do not necessarily
give rise to unit-for-unit changes in w. However, stability of the general-equilibrium struc-
ture of wages and employment requires that an increase in the ex post wage rate w give rise
to an excess supply of labor in the ex post market. This stability condition (S) is stated for-
mally in Appendix C. Using this condition, general-equilibrium comparative-statics analysis
shows that:
Theorem 2: For values of the migration cost parameter c such that the system reaches a
full-employment equilibrium, and assuming that the spot-market stability condition (S) is
satised, increased economic integration (i.e., a reduction in the migration cost parameter
c) results in:
(i) a decrease in the ex post spot-market wage rate w (i.e., dw=dc > 0);
(ii) an increase in the level of employment in the good state (i.e., dn1=dc < 0);
(iii) a decrease in the level of employment in the bad state (i.e., dn2=dc > 0).
Proof: See Appendix C.
This result closely parallels the ndings for the mixed regime, although in this case the
impact of increased integration on the implicit contract wage rate w is uncertain. Broadly
speaking, the qualitative impacts of economic integration on the state-contingent levels of
employment and output are the same in this case as in the mixed regime.
C. Autarky vs. Full Integration: Global Comparisons
The analysis so far has shown that there are three possible types of equilibria in the
model. In autarky, migration costs are so high that migration is never observed. Implicit
contracts result in layos that generate unemployment for some workers in regions with
unfavorable production shocks. When migration costs are very low, equilibrium labor con-
tracts also result in layos when there are unfavorable production shocks, but workers that
are laid o migrate to other regions where they are able to nd new jobs, so that there is no
unemployment. In between these extremes, if migration costs are suciently high but not
prohibitive, implicit labor contracts will give rise to layos in the bad state and while some
of the workers who are laid o will migrate to other regions and nd new jobs, others will
remain in the jurisdictions in which they are laid o and will be unemployed. For present
purposes, the mixed regime is of greatest interest, since we wish to explore the implications
of migration in an economy with unemployment. Before turning to a more detailed analysis
of the mixed regime in Section IV, however, it is useful to make some comparisons of the
equilibria across regimes.
17Imagine a process of economic integration in which migration costs are at rst pro-
hibitively high, falling gradually over time and nally ending in a situation of free migration
where workers are perfectly mobile among jurisdictions. Comparing the starting and end-
ing points of this process, we note that employment contracts in autarky are characterized
by positive levels of unemployment in bad states. When migration costs vanish, however,
there is no longer any unemployment. In regions experiencing favorable shocks, output and
employment are higher than they would be under autarky, while the opposite is true for
regions experiencing adverse shocks. Nevertheless, workers receive the same wage in both
states, and this wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. In fact, workers face no
wage or unemployment risk at all. The need for implicit contracts to insure workers against
income risk is obviated and thus they completely disappear.
Starting from an equilibrium in a mixed regime, the elimination of migration costs elim-
inates all unemployment. Similarly, starting from an equilibrium in the full-employment
regime, an increase in migration costs to prohibitively high levels brings about unemploy-
ment. It is not necessarily the case, however, that small reductions in migration costs
necessarily cause unemployment to decrease. It is easy to see from Theorems 1 and 2 that
the state-contingent employment levels n1 and n2 vary monotonically across regimes, with
n1 steadily rising as c falls and n2 steadily falling. In general, however, total employment in
the system as a whole, n1 + (1   )n2, may rise or fall as c falls incrementally. See Figure
1 for an illustration of some of the main results obtained so far in the case where  = :5 and
where we assume that there is only one interval of values of the migration cost parameter
in which each regime can occur.
IV. Economic Integration, Income Distribution, and Welfare in the Mixed
Regime
The analysis of Section III has focused on the positive economics of economic inte-
gration. It shows that changes in the migration cost parameter c have certain impacts on
levels of employment, output, and wages. This section extends the analysis to consider how
changes in migration costs aect economic welfare. We are mainly interested in the impact
of economic integration and migration in an economy where there is also some unemploy-
ment, and thus we restrict attention in this section to the welfare eects of increased labor
mobility in the mixed regime discussed in Section III.A.
So far, the model has assumed that there are two dierent groups of agents in the
economy, workers and rms. While the former are risk averse and try to maximize expected
utility, the latter are assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize expected prots. A natural
justication for the assumption of risk-neutrality on the part of rms is that they are owned
by individuals who themselves are risk neutral. Alternatively, they may be owned by risk-
averse individuals who have diversied portfolios (perhaps through nancial intermediaries)
and who therefore can perfectly pool independent risks among rms (and regions). For the
moment, let us consider workers and the owners of rms as completely distinct groups, with
18the welfare of the former given by expected utility and the welfare of the latter given by
expected prots. 21
As shown above, a change in migration costs alters the entire general-equilibrium con-
guration of employment and wages in the economy. All of these changes aect both the
expected utility of workers and the expected prots of rms. Nevertheless, it is straightfor-
ward to see how a change in c aects the welfare of each group. As shown in Theorem 1,
increased economic integration (a reduction in c) causes the equilibrium number of workers
laid o in the bad state to rise. In the mixed regime, laid-o workers may either be un-
employed or may migrate, but in either case they receive a net income of b (recall (14)),
irrespective of the value of c. Furthermore, the implicit contract wage w received by those
workers who are not laid o must fall as migration costs fall. Unambiguously, therefore,
the expected utility of workers must fall as c falls. Formally, recalling the expression for




















The impact of a change in c on expected prots is also easily calculated, essentially






















The inequality in (17) follows from Theorem 1, which shows that w, w, and n2 are all
increasing in c, and from (12), which shows that workers are paid more than the value
of their marginal products in the bad state. In words, the wage rate at which rms hire
workers in the spot market in the good state is higher when migration costs are higher. The
implicit contract wage rate is also higher in both states which in itself tends to raise costs
for given levels of employment in each state; moreover, the number of workers employed in
the bad state is higher, and the amount that these additional workers are paid exceeds the
extra revenue that they produce for their employers. For all of these reasons, an increase in
migration costs lowers expected prots. In summary, we have shown
Theorem 3: For values of the migration cost parameter c such that the system reaches
a mixed equilibrium, increased economic integration (i.e., a reduction in the migration cost
parameter c) results in
(i) a decrease in the expected utility of workers (i.e., dEU=dc > 0);
(ii) an increase in the expected prots of rms (i.e., dM=dc < 0).
21 Recall that \prots" are interpreted as the return to xed and quasi-xed factors of
production such as land or natural resources (see n. 4 above).
19In brief, economic integration works against the interests of workers and in favor of
the interests of rms and their owners. Roughly speaking, greater migration opportunities
increase the supply of workers to expanding rms (those that experience favorable production
shocks) and lowers the marginal product of labor in the good state. This \depreciates" the
implicit insurance premium paid by workers in the good state; anticipating this, the implicit
contract wage w is reduced and the level of layos in the bad state is increased. From the
viewpoint of rms, the downward pressure on wages and the increased exibility of state-
contingent employment is benecial. For workers, however, the reduced implicit contract
wage results in a worse outcome in the good state and also a worse outcome in the bad
state if they are not laid o. If they are in fact laid o, some may migrate rather than
remain unemployed, but those who migrate do not enjoy any net gain from doing so as the
spot wage is only suciently high to compensate them for migration costs. Furthermore,
more workers end up being laid o when migration costs are lower. The upshot is that the
increased migration that results from more integrated labor markets reduces labor market
rigidities, but in a way that only helps rms and actually makes workers worse o. It is
worth recalling, in this context, that increased labor mobility may or may not reduce overall
unemployment. It is important to note that workers are harmed by labor market integration
even if the total unemployment rate is reduced.
In a model with exible wages and full employment (cf. Wildasin (1995)), workers may
or may not benet from increased labor market integration depending on the precise form of
the production technology (labor demand functions in the good and the bad state) and on
the degree of risk aversion of workers. By contrast, the present analysis shows that workers
are unambiguously harmed by incremental increases in labor market exibility in a world of
implicit contracts and unemployment. Evidently, increased mobility worsens the terms of
the implicit insurance oered by rms to workers, reducing the protection against income
risk that workers obtain in a more sheltered market environment.
Since labor market integration benets one group while harming another, it is obviously
not Pareto-improving. It is natural to ask, however, how the gains and losses to dierent
groups compare, and whether it could be possible for the gainers to compensate the losers. To
address this question, it is necessary to make the gains and losses to each group comparable
in some way. One natural way to do so is to assume that the value of money income is
equally valuable for both groups. The welfare of the owners of rms is measured in money
in any case, which thus has a marginal value of unity. For workers, one unit of money
income, obtained with certainty, raises expected utility by the amount









which means that a worker is willing to pay an amount of money 1=Eu0() in order to obtain
a one-unit increase in expected utility (or must be paid this amount to compensate for a
one unit reduction in expected utility). Thus, in monetary terms, the impact of a change in






Greater labor market integration results in a potential Pareto improvement if the gains
to rms are more than sucient to compensate workers for their losses. Formally, the gains
to the rms in a jurisdiction net of the monetized value of the losses to the workers can be
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using (12). That is, it is possible, in principle, for the owners of rms to make compensation
payments to workers that would oset the adverse eects of labor market integration and
allow both groups to gain from increased mobility of workers:
Theorem 4: For values of the migration cost parameter c such that the system reaches
a mixed equilibrium, increased economic integration (i.e., a reduction in the migration cost
parameter c) is potentially Pareto-improving.
Of course, it is in practice dicult or impossible to devise a distortionless compensation
scheme between rms and workers that would insure that increased labor mobility really
results in a Pareto improvement. In practice, therefore, economic integration would benet
the owners of rms while harming workers. A judgment as to the desirability of economic
integration thus necessitates an evaluation of gains and losses to dierent groups. A social
welfare function that attaches equal value to the incomes of both groups would regard
potential Pareto improvements (i.e., changes that satisfy a compensation test) as socially
desirable. On this basis, improved labor market integration would be viewed as welfare-
improving. Clearly this would also be true for any social welfare function that attaches a
greater weight to the income accruing to the owners of rms than to the incomes of workers,
whereas greater worker mobility would be socially undesirable if evaluated using a social
welfare function that attaches suciently higher weight to the welfare of workers.
The discussion so far has treated workers and the owners of rms (or of immobile
resources) as completely distinct groups. In practice, workers receive some non-wage income
from capital and from their direct or indirect ownership of land, natural resources, and other
xed factors. The adverse eect of economic integration on their welfare could therefore be
partially oset by gains that they experience from increases in any prots that are distributed
to them. Indeed, as an extreme case, one could imagine that all prots accrue to workers who
hold perfectly diversied equity portfolios, giving each worker an equal share of the prots
accruing to rms in all jurisdictions. Since risks among regions are independent, each worker
would receive, with certainty, a prot income of M= n in addition to its wage income. In this
21case, (18) shows that the expected utility of each worker must rise as economic integration
improves. In eect, perfectly functioning asset markets { which must themselves be fully
integrated so that workers can diversify their ownership of rms (and xed factors such as
land or natural resources) among jurisdictions { serve as a compensation mechanism so that
economic integration produces an actual Pareto improvement.
V. Conclusion
The preceding analysis has investigated the consequences of changes in the extent of
labor market integration, represented in the model by a migration cost parameter c. In
contrast to much previous research on labor mobility, we have not assumed that labor
markets are characterized by full employment in all circumstances; in contrast to much
previous research on unemployment, we have not assumed that local labor markets are
completely isolated from one another. As we have seen, changes in labor mobility aect the
conditions under which workers and rms enter into long-term implicit contracts, resulting
in changes in the structure of wages and in the levels of employment in dierent states of the
world. These contracts are part of the institutional structure of labor markets which may be
implemented not only through purely private arrangements between rms and workers but
through public policies such as labor market regulations. Thus, in exploring the dependence
of equilibrium contract structures on the \technology" of labor mobility, as represented by
c, our analysis can sheds light on the determinants and evolution of institutional structure.
Any relatively simple and stylized model, such as that presented above, cannot possibly
capture all important aspects of highly complex labor market institutions. As mentioned
at the outset, there are several competing models of labor markets which do not clear
instantaneously, such as the insider-outsider model, models of unionized labor markets, job-
matching models, and, of course, implicit contract models. There is little consensus in
the literature about which of these approaches provides the most satisfactory explanation
of various labor-market phenomena, and it is certainly not our purpose to argue that the
implicit contract approach is necessarily superior to its competitors in all respects. Nor,
indeed, are all of these models necessarily incompatible with one another; our own analysis
can be viewed as a blend that combines implicit contract theory with some aspects of insider-
outside models. In any case, the model presented above does seem to be broadly consistent
with important aspects of the labor market institutions and experiences of dierent countries;
in particular, it does explain wage stickiness (\rigidities") in regional labor markets that are,
to some degree, isolated from other. It also is quite consistent with the observation that
labor market exibility need not result in a high degree of spatial wage dispersion, as regional
labor demand shocks give rise to high levels of interregional labor ows rather than large
uctuations in wages.
The analysis shows that the risks faced by workers, their economic welfare, and the
prots of rms all change as labor mobility increases. As migration costs diminish, the
terms of implicit contracts, that is, labor market institutions, adjust so that employment
22varies more across states of nature. Increased mobility leads to a more exible labor market
in which rms with high labor demand are better able to respond to market conditions by
hiring additional workers, while those facing adverse conditions are more able to shed workers
for whom the wage rate exceeds their marginal product. If migration costs fall suciently,
mobility makes it possible for all workers who are laid o to move to jurisdictions with high
demand for labor and unemployment { at least within our admittedly stylized model of
many regions with independent labor demand shocks { completely disappears. However, if
migration costs remain relatively high, some workers who are laid o will remain unemployed
even though others migrate and nd new jobs.
The analysis has also shown that increased integration of labor markets can harm
workers, at least in cases where migration costs do not fall suciently to completely eliminate
unemployment, that is, in cases where both migration and unemployment are observed.
In fact, in the absence of some sort of compensation mechanism, workers are denitely
harmed by greater labor mobility. Firms, on the other hand, benet from labor mobility
in the sense that expected prots necessarily rise as migration costs fall. The ability to
hire additional workers in response to positive shocks reduces the implicit premium that
the rms' existing workers pay, in favorable states of nature, under the implicit contract,
leading to a change in the terms of the implicit contract in a way that ultimately reduces
labor market rigidities. Workers are consequently exposed to increased risk of layo and to
a reduced implicit contract wage.
Although labor market integration may have adverse eects on workers, it also improves
the eciency of resource allocation. Our analysis has shown that it is possible, in principle,
for the increased prots of rms to be used to oset the losses suered by workers in such a
way that all could benet from increased labor mobility. To some extent, workers do share
directly or indirectly in the prots of rms { not necessarily or even ordinarily the prots
of the particular rms in which they are employed { through the ownership of nancial
assets. Banks, stock markets, and other nancial institutions can provide workers with the
opportunity to hold diversied portfolios in which the independent risks of region-specic
shocks are eectively pooled. In the extreme, if all prot income accrues to workers through
perfectly-functioning capital markets, increased economic integration would raise their non-
wage income by more than enough to fully compensate them for the adverse eects on their
wage income. In practice, of course, some or many workers may not in fact own much wealth,
and the assets that they do own may not be fully diversied, in which case nancial markets
will not provide a very eective mechanism through which workers can be compensated for
the adverse eects of labor market integration.
To some extent, economic integration is the result of ongoing fundamental changes in
transportation, communications, and other technologies that reduce the barriers to mobility
of goods and factors. It is also inuenced by political events such as the breakdown of the
former communist regimes in Eastern Europe. (German unication provides an example
of an immediate and drastic reduction in migration costs.) Our analysis shows that these
23changes can have important distributional eects. In addition to fundamental technological
factors, however, the extent of economic integration, and particularly of labor market inte-
gration, also depends on a wide range of economic policies. The migration cost parameter
c in our model can thus be viewed as determined, in part, by public policy decisions. For
example, the Treaty of Rome, with its explicit provisions concerning the free mobility of
labor without legal, scal, or other formal restrictions, stands as a major policy choice af-
fecting the subsequent (and continuing) evolution of the labor market policies of individual
member states of the EU. The recurring question of whether to expand the EU to include
still more countries repeatedly raises afresh the question of whether the \welfare state",
including labor market protections existing workers, can be sustained in the face of the lib-
eralization of labor mobility that new accessions entail. While we do not attempt to develop
an explicit political-economy model of policies that aect the degree of market integration,
our general-equilibrium welfare analysis, by identifying the gainers and losers from increased
integration (i.e., its distributional eects), obviously could provide a foundation for such a
model. In particular, the analysis shows that policies that enhance labor market integration
could well be viewed as a threat to the welfare of workers and as a benet to the owners of
rms, two groups whose interests therefore could come into conict in the political process.
At the same time, from an ex ante \constitutional" perspective in which all parties step
behind the \veil of ignorance", enhanced labor market integration may well be attractive. 22
Recent papers by Agell (1999, 2000), rather consistently with the spirit of the present
analysis, discuss how labor market rigidities can help to mitigate risks faced by workers,
observing that many of the institutions that support these rigidities originated, historically,
during episodes in which workers appear to have been exposed to substantial uninsured
risks. Agell argues that trade liberalization and other trends that contribute to integration of
markets for goods and services can expose workers to greater risks and thus might increase the
demand for risk-mitigating rigidities in labor markets; by the same token, trade liberalization
may be more palatable in countries with strong \welfare state" provisions. The foregoing
analysis, by contrast, shows that integration of the market for labor can be conducive to
the development of more exible labor market institutions. In a classic study, Mundell
(1957) shows that trade and factor mobility can be \market substitutes". The results above,
however, suggest that liberalization of factor markets and liberalization of output markets
22 A number of authors (e.g., Saint-Paul (1996a, 1996b)) have explored several aspects of
the political economy of labor-market regulations, abstracting from policies that aect the
degree of integration of local labor markets. In the US context, the freedom of interstate
labor mobility has been enshrined in constitutional interpretations and in practice from the
beginning. Thus, insofar as controls on migration are relevant determinants of the migration-
cost parameter c, the labor markets of the individual states of the US have historically been
characterized by lower migration costs than the countries of Europe. An explicit treatment
of the political economy of policies that inuence labor market integration goes beyond the
scope of the present paper, but it would clearly be of value to investigate in greater detail
the potential interplay between labor mobility and the political interests that shape specic
aspects of labor-market institutions.
24may to some extent be \policy complements", in that the costs of risk arising from openness
in output markets may be oset, to some degree, by increased openness in labor markets.
Certainly, the internal market of the US has long been characterized by a high degree of
openness in both goods and factor markets, and the Treaty of Rome similarly envisages
integration in both types of markets.
International agreements such as the European Union, and other mechanisms through
which policies of many jurisdictions are coordinated, aect the costs of labor mobility
throughout an entire system of jurisdictions. From the perspective of a single jurisdiction,
however, the eects of labor market integration may be viewed rather dierently. To begin
with, it should be noted that the policies of individual countries may dierentially aect
the costs of immigration and of emigration. Strict labor market regulations, restrictions
on immigration, or other policies that limit the ability or incentives of rms to hire new
workers can discourage immigration, while guest or temporary worker programs encourage
rms to hire workers who come from other countries (e.g., the German Gastarbeiter program
or the bracero program in the US). These policies aect the cost of entry into a jurisdiction.
Countries may also pursue education, training, and other policies that, among other conse-
quences, may make it easier for workers to emigrate to other locations, i.e., that aect the
cost of exit from a jurisdiction. Fiscal policies, including both the taxation of earnings and
the provision of unemployment benets, income support, and other social benets will also
aect the incentives to enter or to leave a given country.
While our formal analysis has not distinguished between the cost of entry into a juris-
diction and the cost of exit, it clearly implies that reductions in entry costs have eects that
are quite dierent from reductions in the cost of exit, when viewed from the perspective of
any one jurisdiction. In any single jurisdiction, workers denitely benet from the opportu-
nity to go elsewhere in search of employment if local labor conditions are unfavorable. In
equilibrium, workers can obtain more attractive long-term contracts from local employers if
they have better external opportunities. These changes in the terms of long-term contracts,
however, adversely aect the prots of local rms. Conversely, when it is less costly for
workers to immigrate to a given jurisdiction, the welfare of the workers in that locality falls,
while the prots of local rms rise. Policies that reect the interests of workers in any one
jurisdiction would thus tend to favor easy exit and dicult entry, for example in the form of
strict immigration policies coupled with few or no restrictions on emigration, while policies
that favor the interests of the owners of rms would work in the opposite direction.
One might suppose that public policies could be used to compensate workers for the
adverse eects of integration. For instance, tax/transfer policies such as personal and cor-
poration income taxes could capture part of the increases in prots that accrue to rms
and their owners while reducing scal burdens on workers. Other public policies, however,
might accentuate the adverse eects of integration on workers. For example, pay-as-you-go
public pension programs are a major asset for many households in advanced economies.
The implicit rate of return in such systems is highly positively correlated with labor mar-
25ket conditions. Since labor market integration increases the risk of layos and (at least
in some cases) reduces wages, jurisdiction-specic public pension programs (e.g., national
public pension programs in EU countries), far from compensating workers for the adverse
eects of greater mobility, actually exacerbate these eects. Clearly, economic integration
presents complex and subtle challenges for the formulation of tax, social insurance, and
other public policies. The foregoing analysis has developed a general-equilibrium framework
within which public policy questions concerning the eects of economic integration in the
presence of unemployment could usefully be explored. Further investigation of these issues,
however, lies beyond the scope of the present paper.
26REFERENCES
Agell, J. (1999), \On the Benets From Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Markets Failures,
and Social Insurance", Economic Journal 109, 143{164.
Agell, J. (2000), \On the Determinants of Labor Market Institutions: Rent-Sharing vs.
Social Insurance", unpublished.
Azariadis, C. (1975), \Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of
Political Economy 83, 1183{1202.
Baily, M. N. (1974), \Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 41, 37{50.
Baily, M. N. (1977), \On the Theory of Lay-os and Unemployment," Econometrica 45,
1043{64.
Beaudry, P. and J. DiNardo (1991), \The Eect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement
of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political
Economy 99, 665{688.
Baudry, P. and J. DiNardo (1995), \Is the Behavior of Hours Worked Consistent with
Implicit Contract Theory?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 743{768.
Bertola, G. (1999), \Microeconomic Perspectives on Aggregate Labor Markets," in O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), H Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3 (Amsterdam:
North-Holland), andbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland),
2985{3028.
Bertola, G. and A. Ichino (1995), \Crossing the River: A Comparative Perspective on Italian
Employment Dynamics," Economic Policy 21, 359{420.
Burda, M. C. and A. Mertens (1995), \Locational Competition versus Cooperation in Labor
Markets: An Implicit Contract Reinterpration," in H. Siebert (ed.), Locational Compe-
tition in the World Economy (T ubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)), 71{107.
Ethier, W. J. (1985), \International Trade and Labor Migration", American Economic Re-
view 75, 691{707.
Feldstein, M. (1976), \Temporary Lay-os in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of
Political Economy 84, 937{57.
Gordon D. F. (1974), \A Neo-Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment," Economic
Inquiry 12, 431{459.
27Grossman, S. J and O. D. Hart (1981), \Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard and Unemploy-
ment," American Economic Review 71, 301{307.
Grossman, S. J and O. D. Hart (1983), \Implicit Contracts under Asymmetrical Informa-
tion," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (Supplement), 123{156.
Harris, J.R. and P. Todaro (1970), \Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two-
Sector Analysis," American Economic Review 60, 126{142.
Hart, O. D. (1981), \Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Intro-
duction," Review of Economic Studies 50, 3{35.
Leslie, D. (1992), \Insider-Outsider Theory and the Case for Implicit Contracts," Economic
Journal 102, 37{48.
Lindbeck, A. and D. Snower (1988) The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Un-
employment (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Mundell, R. A. (1957) \International Trade and Factor Mobility", American Economic Re-
view 47, 321{335.
Nickell, S. (1997), \Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe vs. North Amer-
ica," Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 55{74.
Nickell, S. (1999), \Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance", in O. Ashenfelter
and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland),
3029{ 3084.
Rosen, S. (1985), \Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature 23, 1144{
1175.
Saint-Paul, G. (1996a), \Labor Market Institutions and Cohesion of the Middle Class",
International Tax and Public Finance 3, 385{368.
Saint-Paul, G. (1996b), \Exploring the Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions",
Economic Policy 23, 265{315.
Saint-Paul, G. (1997), \The Rise and Persistence of Rigidities", American Economic Review
87, 290{294.
Shin, K. (1997), \Inter- and Intrasectoral Shocks: Eects on the Unemployment Rate",
Journal of Labor Economics 15, 376.
Taylor, M.P. (1987), \The Simple Analytics of Implicit Labour Contracts," Bulletin of Eco-
nomic Research 39, 1{27.
Topel, R.H. (1991), \Specic Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority,"
28Journal of Political Economy 99, 145{176.
Wildasin, D.E. (1995), \Factor Mobility, Risk, and Redistribution in the Welfare State,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97(4), 527{546.
29Appendix A
If the equality holds in equation (2), and making use of w1 = w2 = w, condition (2)
denes the state independent implicit contract wage as a function of the employment level
in each state n1 and n2, and the expected utility that workers obtain elsewhere:
w(n1;n2; ~ uA):





















[n1 + (1   )n2]u0(w)
> 0: (A:3)
The prot function (1) can then be rewritten as
A = p1f(n1) + (1   )p2f(n2)   w(n1;n2; ~ uA)[n1 + (1   )n2] (A:4)






























































  > 0: (A:10)















































Proof of Theorem 1:
The rst-order conditions for the maximization problem PM, (7c){(7e), together with
(14), provide four equations that determine the general-equilibrium impact of changes in





establishing part (i) of the theorem.








which proves part (iii) of the theorem.
Using the implicit function theorem, (7e) determines the level of employment in the






(u(w)   u[w   c])u00(w)
u0(w)2 > 0: (B:3)
In turn, (7c) can be used to determine the implicit contract wage w in terms of n2 and


























 n + (1   )n2 + (1   )
[u(w)   u(w   c)]u00(w)
u0(w)2






which establishes part (ii) of the theorem.









which proves part (iv) of the theorem.
Q.E.D.
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 2:
The comparative statics results for the full-employment regime are similar to the mixed
regime. Equations (7c) to (7e) represent the rst-order conditions. However, under full
employment, the equilibrium spot wage is no longer determined by condition (14); rather,
full-employment requires that
n1 + (1   )n2 =  n: (C:1)
Equation (7c){(7e) and (C.1) provide a system of four equations to determine the equilibrium
values of n1;n2;w, and w.
To begin with, (7e) can be used to solve implicitly for n2 as a function of w and w  c.









Next, substituting the implicit function n2(w;w   c) into (7c), one can solve for w as
a function of (w;c). Dening

















































A 1 < 0: (C:5)
Substituting from (C.1) and using the implicit functions n2(w;w   c) and w(w;c)











General-equilibrium stability of the ex post spot market for labor requires that an increase
in the spot wage w lead to excess supply, i.e., that



































































  n2   A

; (C:8)
where the equality in (C.8) follows after substituting again from (C.2). Finally, substituting
from (B.3) into (C.3) and thence into (C.8), it follows after some rearrangement that the
bracketed expression in (C.7) is positive, which establishes part (i) of Theorem 2. Part (ii)
follows immediately from part (i) and (7d), and (iii) follows from (ii) and (C.1).
Q.E.D.
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